

TCP 02-75

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Trends in Communist Propaganda

15 Jan 75

TCP-02-75

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TRENDS

In Communist Propaganda

Confidential

15 JANUARY 1975
(VOL. XXVI, NO. 2)

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Two Years From Date of Issue

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SOVIET LEADERSHIP

BREZHNEV TREATMENT IN MEDIA UNCHANGED BY POLICY SETBACKS

Despite a number of signs that Brezhnev's policies may be suffering setbacks, there has been no evidence in the media as yet that his status in the leadership is being openly challenged. The press continues to accord him the special signs of distinction which have long served to identify him as first among equals in the leadership. Moreover, he is still presented as the principal spokesman and executor of Soviet policy, and there have been no clear signs that other leaders are taking opposing positions on critical issues of policy.

By itself, this evidence does not contradict the view that Brezhnev may be in trouble. It does suggest, however, that the formalities of consensus politics are still being observed. This is a point for Brezhnev, since it indicates that whatever trouble may have arisen in the leadership it has not yet reached the point where opposing factions feel it necessary to appeal to broader constituencies. Brezhnev has based his leadership on his ability to represent the consensus, and he has been careful to insure formal leadership approval of his major steps in foreign policy.

POLICY SHIFTS The view that Brezhnev may be in trouble rests on a combination of indications and inferences. Besides the rumors of his illness--which, if true, would almost certainly prompt a succession struggle among the other leaders--there have been a number of actions by the Soviet Government in recent weeks which suggest changes of attitude on critical policy issues. The renunciation of the 1972 U.S.-Soviet trade agreement is only the latest such action. The publication of Gromyko's letter to Secretary Kissinger on the Jewish emigration issue, the shift in economic priorities from light to heavy industry announced at the December Supreme Soviet session, and the postponement of Brezhnev's visit to Egypt are other recent cases in point. While none of them necessarily implies a rebuke to Brezhnev, they at least suggest that he was operating on assumptions which the leadership felt it necessary to discard.

These events raise the possibility that Brezhnev has become vulnerable to attack on the grounds that he has lost control of affairs. On the linked issues of the trade bill and Jewish emigration he has apparently been badly embarrassed. The restriction on credits contained in the bill effectively undercut the expectations which he had raised concerning an expansion of U.S.-Soviet trade, and the publicity in the

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United States about Soviet concessions on Jewish emigration has put his management of the affair in doubt. The bluster about national dignity in Podgorny's speech in Dushanbe on 29 November may have been a pale reflection of the character of internal debates on this issue.*

Brezhnev's vulnerability on the issues of economic priorities and policy toward Egypt is not clear. His endorsement of the light industry line at the 24th CPSU Congress was less than enthusiastic, and hence the return to the heavy industry line announced at the December Supreme Soviet session does not necessarily reflect on him personally. Nevertheless, one would expect the general secretary to be seen as being in the forefront of any such major shift in Soviet policy, and this has not been clearly established as yet in Soviet press reporting on the Supreme Soviet session or on the CPSU plenum which preceded it. Similar ambiguity surrounds the reasons for the postponement of Brezhnev's trip to Egypt. If illness was not the sole reason, it would seem, at least, that the reliability of the estimates on which the trip was originally scheduled has been put in doubt. Brezhnev's responsibility in this regard must have been shared with the other leaders, but this would not necessarily protect him from criticism if the question of his leadership is put at issue.

STATUS INDICATORS Although these recent events suggest a guarded prognosis concerning Brezhnev's political health, Soviet press treatment of Brezhnev in recent weeks provides no corroborating evidence. On the contrary, it continues to accord him all the marks of special deference which have long served to distinguish him from the other leaders.

Brezhnev dominated the 16 December Central Committee plenum with a major speech on the economy and foreign policy, which is being heralded in editorials and speeches as providing the guidelines for 1975. At meetings, in speeches and editorials he continues to be set above his colleagues as "head" of the Politburo, and his domestic and international accomplishments have been widely praised. His 68th birthday and his mother's death received unusual personalized treatment in the press.

* For a discussion of this speech in the context of Soviet comment on the Vladivostok summit, see "Podgorny, RED STAR Register Dissent from Detente Mood," in the TRENDS of 19 December 1974, page 6.

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Although the 16 December plenum speech was not published, the apparent gist of it was summarized in a long 18 December PRAVDA editorial, which was reprinted in other papers. Post-plenum editorials and speeches have indicated that Brezhnev analyzed fulfillment of the five-year plan while setting economic tasks for 1975, and also analyzed foreign policy in detail. Although few specific indications of what he said have appeared, subsequent articles have emphasized three statements attributed to him: that heavy industry is the "backbone" of the economy, that speeding of scientific-technical progress and improvement of management are the main levers for raising the economy, and that the whole party and country must be roused to fulfill and overfulfill the 1975 plan. These statements were being widely cited in editorials in late December and early January.

At the 18-20 December Supreme Soviet session Brezhnev received generous praise from most speakers. In addition, the proceedings were interrupted on 19 December for the presiding officer to wish Brezhnev a happy birthday and to praise his "outstanding" work. The deputies gave Brezhnev a long, standing ovation, and the press accounts stressed the occasion by printing Brezhnev's name in capital letters.

The plenum and Supreme Soviet session were followed by republic Central Committee plenums, which adopted decrees endorsing the "theses and conclusions" of Brezhnev's plenum speech and approving his work in pursuing peace and detente.

Praise for Brezhnev continued undiminished in early January. The Central Committee appeal for socialist competition to overfulfill 1975 goals, published in the 4 January PRAVDA, referred to the Politburo "headed by" Brezhnev, as did a 5 January PRAVDA editorial. At 7 and 8 January ceremonies in Volgograd, the Politburo "headed by" Brezhnev was elected as honorary presidium, and Politburo member Kulakov, awarding orders of Lenin to the oblast and its tractor plant, carried personal greetings from Brezhnev and lauded Brezhnev's December plenum speech, declaring that it "opens a new page in the theory and practice of economic and cultural development and arms our party and all the Soviet people with a concrete and scientifically founded program of action."

Although the Soviet press rarely mentions family matters affecting the leaders, PRAVDA devoted seven paragraphs to describing the 8 January funeral of Brezhnev's mother. It was attended by 11 Politburo members. Kunayev, Kulakov and Shcherbitskiy were out of town; Kosygin did not attend, although he, like all other members, signed the letter of condolences to Brezhnev. The funeral has been Brezhnev's only public appearance so far this year.

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U. S. - SOVIET RELATIONS

MOSCOW STEPS UP ATTACK ON KISSINGER OIL "THREAT"

Moscow has sharpened its attack in recent days on Secretary Kissinger's statement in his BUSINESS WEEK interview that the United States might consider the use of force in the event of "actual strangulation" of the industrialized world. During the first few days after the initial TASS Russian summary of the interview on 3 January, Moscow was circumspect in its treatment, avoiding direct quotation and conveying its critical reaction mainly through reports of foreign press reaction. In more recent comment, it has not only quoted Kissinger directly, but has implied that the statement represents a considered U.S. strategy aimed at sharpening the confrontation between the oil-producing and oil-consuming nations.

An article in SOVIET RUSSIA on the 8th quoted Kissinger as condoning the possible use of force in circumstances of extreme emergency. It referred to the statement in the context of a broad discussion of the U.S. reaction to the world oil crisis. Characterizing this reaction generally, it said that it reflected ideas inherited from the era of "gun-boat diplomacy." An article of similar tone and breadth by Grigoryants in IZVESTIYA on the 8th charged that the Secretary's remarks were part of a "carefully planned tactic" toward the oil-producing states. From the outset of the oil crisis, it said, the United States had shown no desire to understand the needs of these countries and to seek compromises, but had aimed rather at "confrontation." It had relied on a "policy of diktat" not only to intimidate the oil-producing countries but to strengthen its leadership in Europe.

The European angle was played up in a Sidorov commentary to Germany on the 12th. Referring to the Kissinger statement in the context of a generalized attack on Western policy in the Mideast, he described it as a "sort of climax" of a NATO campaign of threats and intimidation. He went on to say that the West European press was interpreting it as carrying the threat of embroiling Europe in a Mideast war. In this connection, he hinted that a secret deal calling for West German-U.S. cooperation in the event of a new Mideast emergency had been arranged when Secretary Schlesinger visited Germany at the time of the NATO nuclear planning group session in November 1973. Much the same charges, including the account of a "secret deal," were included in another commentary to Germany, by Zakharov, on the 11th.

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This sharpening attack against Kissinger comes against the background of a general hardening of the tone of Moscow comment on U.S. policy. A common theme in this comment has been the contention that detente is under increasing attack in the United States. The image of the political climate in the United States is presented as a dialectical struggle, in which, as a 7 January PRAVDA Strelnikov dispatch put it, "the greater the successes of the supporters of the idea of detente, the more fiercely the idea is attacked by its opponents." At the same time, Moscow projects confidence that the outcome will ultimately favor the forces of detente. This was the conclusion of a Shragin "International Situation" report on Moscow's domestic service on the 11th. Despite the "inconsistencies" and "zigzags" in U.S. policy, the commentator said, "the mighty trend toward detente and peace is clearing everything in its path."

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MIDDLE EAST

MOSCOW SHOWS CONCERN OVER PROSPECTS OF NEW "PARTIAL SOLUTIONS"

Moscow has displayed increasing disquiet over the prospect of new U.S.-assisted efforts for "phased steps" to "partial solutions" in the Middle East rather than a return to the Soviet-supported Geneva conference. Soviet media have ignored Egyptian President as-Sadat's recent series of interviews in which he expressed support for both the U.S. and Soviet "theories," but Moscow has made some indirect swipes at his "balanced" policy between the two powers. It has also shown some defensiveness over the prospects for resumption of the Geneva conference, with commentators insisting that the Soviet Union is not the only advocate. Soviet media have pictured the Arab states as confronted on the one hand by "Israeli militarism" and U.S. threats of military intervention against Arab oil producers, while presented on the other hand with renewed negotiating offers, and have rejected the idea that Israel could impose solutions by threat of force.

ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN NEGOTIATIONS	Soviet comment has avoided discussing specifics of the Egyptian and Israeli negotiating positions as reported in Western and Middle East media.
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On Moscow radio's 12 January observers' roundtable, for example, the editor of NEW TIMES' African and Asian affairs department, Dmitriy Volskiy, remarked that Western media in recent days had published "rumors of some territorial concessions that Israel is supposedly willing to contemplate, in particular concessions to Egypt." Responding to the "rumors," Volskiy claimed, first, that the very notion of concessions by Israel was a "false concept" since the territory in question had been illegally seized, and, second, that no Israeli leader had confirmed the reports.* He called the reports "reminiscent of propaganda bluff" designed to block resumption of the Geneva conference, divide the Arab states, and force the Arab side to accept disadvantageous agreements with Israel. To reinforce this point, Volskiy cited the Washington POST

*Israeli Prime Minister Rabin, in an interview with LE FIGARO on 9 February, said that Israel was prepared for a further withdrawal of its forces in the Sinai in exchange for a simple nonbelligerency statement from Egypt. He added that "should real peace be achieved, Israel would be prepared to withdraw from most of Sinai." He stated that even within a peace treaty framework Sharm ash-Shaykh would not be returned to Egypt, but said that the Abu Rudays oil field region and the strategic Mitla and Gidi passes would be.

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to the effect that a Mideast military conflict might break out soon unless some negotiating progress was achieved on a step-by-step basis.

GENEVA
CONFERENCE

Soviet media have defensively deplored the lack of movement toward resumption of the Geneva conference. Volskiy, in the 12 January roundtable program, denounced the "allegation being spread that only the USSR has an interest" in resumption of the conference and that the Arabs actually prefer a bilateral, phased approach. In a Moscow radio commentary on the 13th, Volskiy charged that "imperialist and Zionist propagandists have unleashed a campaign" against the Geneva conference as part of an attempt to divide the Arab states and the USSR.

Soviet defensiveness about the Geneva conference was also indicated by Soviet Mideast specialist Primakov on Moscow radio's 11 January "International Situation" program. Replying to a "listener's question" as to why the Geneva conference had not yet been convened, Primakov said the Soviet position was still correct, that the USSR was not isolated on the issue, and that Moscow's diplomatic efforts had not been successful because of Israel's hardline opposition, reinforced by support from "certain U.S. circles." He asserted that although "an alternative might seem to be partial solutions on particular matters," only a reconvened Geneva conference could deal with the issues "on a comprehensive basis."

In stressing Arab support for the Soviet position, Primakov listed Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), adding that the PLO's previous negative position on participation in a Geneva conference "is now a thing of the past." In this connection, Primakov recalled his conversation with PLO chairman Yasir 'Arafat in Cairo in June 1974, as well as the decision of the Rabat Arab summit conference last October that the PLO represented all Palestinians, a decision Primakov said "was appraised by the world press as a mandate for Geneva and the holding of talks there." Primakov charged that Israel's refusal to negotiate with the PLO at Geneva--"now, when the Palestinians are ready"--was only a pretext to conceal Israel's belief it could impose solutions on the Arabs through military threats and U.S. support.

TREATMENT
OF AS-SADAT

In depicting Arab support for the Soviet diplomatic approach to a Mideast settlement, Moscow media have ignored President as-Sadat's remarks in several recent interviews. In his comments, as-Sadat has carefully balanced

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favorable references to both the U.S.-sponsored phased approach and the Soviet-supported Geneva conference--at the same time renewing complaints about Soviet recalcitrance in responding to Egyptian arms requests. Moscow's failure to note any of his recent interviews makes all the more conspicuous the highly selective nature of Soviet reporting from Egyptian sources. For example, TASS on the 13th cited the Cairo weekly ROSE AL-YUSUF--apparently the same issue which carried still another as-Sadat interview--as saying that Egypt "completely rejects the idea of a phased and partial settlement" and "proposals for graduated steps to end the state of war."

Moscow's criticism of as-Sadat has thus far been indirect, as exemplified in a 13 January Moscow broadcast in Arabic summarizing a PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM article by Iraqi Communist Party leader Aziz Muhammad. According to the broadcast, the article criticized Arabs who "continue to vacillate between the socialist and capitalist worlds on the pretext that in this way they remain detached from both blocs"--a clear reference to as-Sadat's advocacy of a "balanced policy" between the USSR and the United States. Muhammad was also quoted as declaring that "such vacillation is regarded as a retreat from the alliance with socialist countries and as a replacement of anti-imperialist principles with diplomatic maneuvers and deception."

As in past instances of Soviet-Egyptian friction over Cairo's foreign or domestic policies, Budapest has again spoken out more forthrightly while Moscow has been cautious and indirect in criticism. An unattributed commentary on Budapest domestic television on the 7th, making charges similar to those expressed by Muhammad, left no doubt as to its target. Citing U.S. "intimidations" against Arab states said to be evident in Secretary Kissinger's 13 January BUSINESS WEEK interview, the commentary asserted that threats against the Arabs would be ineffective if Arab unity were stronger and

in particular, if President as-Sadat, the leader of Egypt, which one can regard as the most important, would not try to hold two irons in the fire. While accepting full support from the USSR, he apparently continues to pin his hopes on the Americans' step-by-step policy to settle his claims with Israel.

FOUR-PARTY The Hungarian television commentary, in another
CONFERENCE complaint against Egypt, asserted that at the
 3-4 January Cairo conference of Egyptian, Syrian,
Jordanian and PLO representatives, Egypt had attempted to persuade

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the Palestinians to accept a compromise that would have "exposed them to the mercy of Kissinger's protection seeking results step-by-step." Judging from some post-conference Palestinian comment, such as an 'Arafat interview in the 7 January Paris LE MONDE, the reference to a compromise related to an Egyptian proposal that Jordan be allowed to negotiate for the Palestinians. Moscow's comment on the Cairo conference, ignoring this aspect, has been confined largely to replays of the official statement on the meeting. As reported by Cairo radio on the 4th, the statement indicated that Jordanian-PLO relations had been a source of disagreement, that further four-party and bilateral meetings would be held, and that the sides meanwhile agreed to refrain from measures or statements that "do not help the development of relations" between the PLO and Jordan.

Acknowledging the continuing differences, Moscow's "unofficial" Radio Peace and Progress said on the 9th that although the Cairo conference was an important step forward in coordinating the sides' political and military positions, such coordination "is not an easy matter that can be achieved in one meeting. This issue is so difficult and complicated that it is at the mercy of time." Referring to past Jordanian-PLO disagreements, the broadcast added that "some forces" had continued to cast doubts on the two sides' reconciliation and "to incite one against the other." At the same time, calling the Cairo conference a "step toward preparing for the Geneva conference," the broadcast added that "it is known that the Arab side to this conference will be represented by the powers that participated in the Cairo meeting"--a statement that could be interpreted as suggesting an umbrella Arab delegation including both Jordanians and Palestinians.

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INDOCHINA

DRV, PRG DEFEND CAPTURE OF PHUOC BINH CITY, REJECT U.S. NOTE

The initial Vietnamese communist reports on their 6 January capture of Phuoc Binh, the provincial capital of Phuoc Long Province, were followed by an outpouring of comment defending the action. The communists have described the capture of the city as a "just" punitive reaction to alleged Saigon violations of the Paris peace agreement and have claimed popular South Vietnamese support for the attacks. Alleged U.S. assistance to the GVN was protested in a series of DRV and PRG foreign ministry spokesmen's statements; and on 14 January a DRV Foreign Ministry statement denounced the 11 January U.S. note on communist actions sent to the Soviet Union, China, and other signators of the March 1973 international act on Vietnam.

COMMENT ON FIGHTING Vietnamese communist commentaries have predictably justified the capture of Phuoc Binh city and the district capitals which have fallen since mid-December as appropriate actions against GVN positions used as "staging-areas" for attacks on PRG-controlled territory. A commentary on 9 January in the North Vietnamese army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN called Phuoc Binh city a "key position in the U.S.-Thieu clique's coercive system along Route 14" and a "base from which this clique launched and directed pacification and nibbling operations in the area northeast of Saigon." The army paper, and other commentaries, recalled earlier official communist calls for "counterattacks" in orders from the People's Liberation Armed Forces (PLAF) Command on 15 October 1973 and 25 November 1974.*

A 9 January PRG Foreign Ministry statement on the fighting portrayed the population as welcoming the attacks, typically claiming that the PLAF "punished the enemy . . . in the provincial capital to help the population rise up and take complete control of the town." While most commentaries were similarly vague in crediting the PLAF and "people" with the capture of Phuoc Binh, an initial Liberation Radio report on 8 January was more explicit. The broadcast cited the "close combat coordination" of the "three categories and armed branches" and praised the "main force units, including infantry forces and technical armed services," for having "fought decisive

* For background on the PLAF orders, see the TRENDS of 11 December 1974, pages 9-10, and 17 October 1973, pages 7-9.

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battles, achieved high combat efficiency, and rapidly destroyed" military positions "one after another."

Communist media have claimed that "thousands" of GVN troops were put out of action in the Phuoc Long fighting. Liberation Radio announced in broadcasts on the 12th and 13th that "nearly all" the captured troops were released--according to their wishes--to "return to their families" rather than be kept as prisoners, since prisoners "would be returned to the Saigon side." The radio also claimed that "a substantial number have volunteered to assume revolutionary tasks."

OFFICIAL PROTESTS
AGAINST GVN, U.S.

Government retaliatory bombing attacks against communist positions in the Loc Ninh and Bu Dop areas on the 7th, 8th, and 9th, were scored in the 9 January PRG Foreign Ministry statement and PRG and DRV foreign ministry spokesmen's statements on the following day. The 10 January spokesmen's protests raised a new communist allegation in charging that "U.S. reconnaissance planes"--RF-4's and unmanned aircraft--"guided" Saigon aircraft in the raids. This is the first known explicit communist charge of such U.S. assistance in Saigon bombing missions, although a 9 October 1974 note to the ICCS from the PRG Joint Military Commission delegation had charged that U.S. reconnaissance over South Vietnam was "aimed at lending a hand to the Saigon administration to intensify its bombing and landgrabbing operations against the PRG-controlled areas." (Prior to the halt to U.S. bombing in Cambodia there were occasions in May 1973 when the communists charged U.S. planes had attacked South Vietnamese areas along the Cambodian border; and U.S. pilots were also accused of flying F-5E's in the South in June 1974.)*

The PRG spokesman's protest on the alleged U.S. involvement in GVN bombing denounced other U.S. actions as well--including the reported dispatch of the aircraft carrier Enterprise toward South Vietnam--as "serious acts of war" against the South Vietnamese people demonstrating that "the Ford Administration has intensified its schemes and acts of direct military involvement and brazen interference" in South Vietnam. (Other comment has continued to complain about the alleged presence of the Enterprise near South Vietnam, ignoring U.S. denials in an effort to portray Administration actions in the darkest of colors.) Later on the 10th, further statements from the PRG and DRV spokesmen leveled other charges

* For background, see the TRENDS of 5 June 1974, pages 17-18, and 16 May 1973, pages 5-7.

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against the United States, among other things, denouncing the "illegal" introduction of weapons into South Vietnam from Thailand.

U.S. reconnaissance flights over North Vietnam on 11 January were protested on the same day with the usual DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement. And a further statement on the 13th cited comments by a U.S. Embassy spokesman in Saigon as confirming U.S. "encroachments" on DRV territory. Like most other such protests since similar flights were first cited in November 1973, the 11 January statement specifically attributed the overflights to SR-71 aircraft. U.S. "spy flights" over both North and South Vietnam were later decried in a 15 January PRG spokesman's statement pegged to a U.S. Defense Department spokesman's statement on the flights.

RESPONSE TO U.S. NOTE The 14 January DRV Foreign Ministry statement-- reacting to the 11 January U.S. note which had been released on the 13th--asserted that the United States "distorted the truth" in accusing the DRV and PRG of turning from the path of negotiations to that of war, and decried "insolent" U.S. "threats" against the Vietnamese. The statement repeated stock communist charges to document its claim that the United States and the Thieu government are, in fact, at fault for "gravely and systematically" violating the Paris agreement--among other things noting U.S. failure to fulfill its obligation to help with postwar DRV reconstruction. While insisting that the DRV and PRG have an "unswerving" policy of respecting the peace agreement, the statement noted that the PRG has "had to take appropriate measures to punish the saboteurs" of the agreement. It demanded that the South Vietnam problem be solved in line with the PRG statement of 8 October 1974, with an end to U.S. involvement, the overthrow of Thieu, and the formation of a new administration in Saigon that will implement the peace agreement.

Consistent with Hanoi's usual practice, the DRV Foreign Ministry statement stopped short of stating that the PRG would hold talks with a government formed after Thieu's removal. This offer from the 8 October government statement was repeated, however, in a statement responding to the U.S. note by the PRG spokesman in Paris. The PRG spokesman's statement, carried by Hanoi media on the 15th, was the first official PRG reaction to the note, although it had been criticized in a Liberation Radio commentary on the 14th.

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DRV FOREIGN MINISTER DENOUNCES THAI POLICY TOWARD U.S.

An "urgent message" on 11 January from the DRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh to Thai Foreign Minister Charunphan underlined Hanoi's evident concern over the continued presence of U.S. forces in Thailand and their alleged role in helping Saigon respond to the current communist attacks. Trinh's message criticized the Thai Government for allegedly allowing the United States to transfer arms from Thailand to South Vietnam and to fly reconnaissance flights from Thailand in support of South Vietnamese bombing. The DRV foreign minister charged that such actions were not consistent with the affirmation that Bangkok wants friendly relations with Hanoi, voiced in a 30 December letter from the Thai foreign minister.

Despite this criticism, the very fact that the North Vietnamese protest was voiced in a personal message from Trinh served to emphasize Hanoi's continuing circumspection in its dealings with Bangkok. Trinh had initiated communication with the Thai foreign minister in a 27 November letter promising negotiations on normalization of relations if U.S. forces are removed from Thailand and Bangkok ended its cooperation with U.S. policies in Indochina. The current message takes care not to cut off the dialog on relations, noting that Charunphan's 30 December response to Trinh's letter was "being studied and will be answered."

A harsher note was struck in a 12 January QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary which accused the Thai Government of being a "lackey of the U.S. imperialists" and indirectly referred to Charunphan's letter as an "impudent statement" when quoting, without attribution its objections to Hanoi's demand for the removal of U.S. forces. The measured tone of Trinh's message was later reinforced, however, in more authoritative press comment on 14 January by NHAN DAN's "Commentator"--a byline regularly used by Hanoi before the January 1973 peace agreement for authoritative comment on important U.S. statements and major foreign policy issues. While echoing Trinh's criticism of Thai policy Commentator reaffirmed the desire of the DRV "Government and people" to establish good relations with the Thai Government, adding that:

The occupation of Thai territory by U.S. troops constitutes a direct threat to Vietnam's sovereignty and security and is a main impediment to improved relations between the two countries.

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Commentator had similarly commented on Trinh's 27 November letter in a 5 December NHAN DAN article. His attention to the issue of DRV-Thai relations is particularly striking since he has only written four other articles since the peace agreement.*

* See the TRENDS of 26 June 1974, pages 12-14, for background on previous Commentator articles.

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PRG DELEGATION WARMLY FELT IN CAMBODIAN LIBERATED ZONE

The 25-29 December visit of a high-level PRG-NFLSV delegation to the Cambodian liberated zone prompted effusive Cambodian and Vietnamese comment testifying to their firm bilateral solidarity. Speeches by Cambodian insurgent leader, RGNU Deputy Prime Minister Khieu Samphan, and by the Vietnamese delegation's leader, PRG President Huynh Tan Phat, also underscored the major shift that has taken place in Cambodian Front strategy over the past year, from previous stress on frontal military assault to bring about the quick defeat of Lon Nol, to classic people's war strategy stressing protracted conflict backed by a productive and well administered liberated zone.

The Vietnamese delegates, including PRG Defense Minister Tran Nam Trung and Foreign Minister Nguyen Thi Binh as well as President Phat, were returning a visit to the Quang Tri liberated zone last June by a RGNU-FUNK delegation led by Khieu Samphan.* In the pattern of the June visit, the guests were hosted at a reception, on 27 December, and at a mass meeting, on the 28th, held formal talks with their allied counterparts, and signed a joint statement on 27 December. Khieu Samphan led the Cambodian side at the talks and spoke at the 27 and 28 December gatherings. RGNU Ministers Hou Youn and Hu Nim were also reported present at the talks and gatherings, the first time the three major Cambodian insurgent leaders have been reported appearing together since the convocation of a major Front congress in the liberated zone in July 1973.

The joint statement on Phat's visit, like the concluding statement on Khieu Samphan's June visit, reported that a "complete identity of views" was reached. Khieu Samphan on the 27th noted that the present visit would bring Cambodian-Vietnamese solidarity to a "new stage"; and Phat on the 28th testified to mutual unity by recalling the April 1970 Indochinese summit resolution and by referring positively to the sensitive Cambodian-Vietnamese border areas as the "common fences and backyards" which have prompted the two countries to join with Laos to form an "interconnecting link" with North Vietnam, thus providing favorable conditions for mutual assistance.

* Khieu Samphan's visit to Quang Tri is discussed in the TRENDS of 3 July 1974, page 10.

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CAMBODIAN FRONT STRATEGY Khieu Samphan's speech on the 27th emphasized tactics suitable for a protracted people's war and reinforced other propaganda evidence of a shift in the Front's military strategy this past year away from emphasis on mass military attacks for a quick victory. He noted especially the importance of developing farm production and water-control projects in the liberated zone, and highlighted the Front's resolve to be in a position of "self-reliance." He pointed to the relative weakening of Lon Nol in comparison with the liberated zone's growing economic and administrative strength, stating that it "is only a question of time" before the "people's war" achieves total victory in conformity with the Front's five-point stance. President Phat on the 28th echoed Khieu Samphan's praise for enhanced productivity in the Cambodian liberated zone and lauded the Front's "self-sufficiency and self-strengthening" that has begun to create "a new mode of life unprecedented in Cambodian history."

Khieu Samphan had similarly reflected the new Front policy in a 13 November 1974 statement issued at the start of the current dry season and in a 31 December 1974 year-end review. These statements, unlike pronouncements on strategy he made in late 1973, gave heavy attention to the "great movement of production" in the liberated zone, warned that existing resources should be used efficiently, and noted that as the liberated zone's strength expands, the Lon Nol administration continues to crumble and the United States--faced with "numerous complicated problems"--reduces aid to Phnom Penh.

PEKING Recent Peking comment has also noted with approval the shift in the Front line. In contrast to its routine listing of Front military victories the previous year, NCNA's 30 December 1974 year-end review of the Cambodian strategic balance hailed "the profound new change" in the Cambodian military situation over the past year. It lauded repeatedly the Front's resolve to follow tactics of "people's war"--a term that was conspicuous by its absence in the NCNA review the year before. Peking noted the gradual buildup of insurgent armed forces, the development of production in the liberated zone, and the capture of U.S.-made weapons from "captain of transportation" Lon Nol to conclude approvingly that the Cambodians have now made "every condition ready for a protracted war."

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PRC FOREIGN RELATIONS

PEKING ARTICLE TOUTS THIRD WORLD STRENGTH, SUPERPOWER DECLINE

An 8 January PEOPLE'S DAILY article by prominent Chinese foreign affairs commentator Jen Ku-ping has given new emphasis to the theme of the Third World's strength vis-a-vis the superpowers. Jen stated that the Third World, if united, "will be able to change the balance of power in the international arena and make it impossible for the superpowers to do evil things." Jen raised the specter of the declining superpowers possibly trying to start a new world war, but--in conformity with Peking's line since Mao's 20 May 1970 statement that "revolution" not war represents the likely prognosis for the present era--he stressed the "revolutionary struggle" of the Third World and the world's peoples.

Jen's statement marks a departure from Peking's usual reluctance to discuss any change in the strategic balance of power between the Third World and the superpowers. It goes beyond a unique claim made by Jen in a 20 September 1974 PEOPLE'S DAILY article--which lauded rising Third World unity over oil and other resource questions--that a change had taken place in the Third World-superpower balance in the international "economic" arena.*

In his current article, Jen again credited economic struggle for bringing about the current "excellent" situation. He pointed out that the "new path" of unity among Third World raw material producers has caused economic dislocations within the superpower countries and has also prompted many Second World countries to realize that they must shift allegiances and "pay greater attention to the Third World countries."

Jen portrayed superpower economic problems as leading to greater U.S.-Soviet rivalry for world control, echoing the authoritative 1975 New Year's Day joint editorial which formally instructed the Chinese people to study the implications of superpower contention and the "current economic crisis of world capitalism." In Jen's graphic description of the current state of big-power conflict, the United States has overextended itself and is like a "fat man" who finds it difficult to move; "not quite so fat as U.S. imperialism" and finding itself in a position of "some weakness" is the Soviet Union, which tries to extend itself and

* For background see the TRENDS of 23 September 1974, pages 16-17.

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"trim off a little of the U.S. imperialist fat." The author's imagery denies the prospect of victory for either, and he states that superpower contention is "prolonged, all-embracing and absolute."

The deepening rivalry between the two powers may, according to Jen, create "the threat of a new war," and in this connection he dredged up a 1939 Mao quotation used to explain the second world war which specifically linked world war with imperialist economic-political difficulties. At the same time, Jen pointed out that "meanwhile, a revolutionary situation is also developing," and he specifically included the struggle of the "Soviet and American people" as part of this revolutionary situation. Warning that "should imperialism and social-imperialism dare to launch a new world war, they will meet with stubborn resistance from the people," Jen stated that the aggressors "will be buried in the raging flames of revolution."

BACKGROUND Peking has long warned against the danger of
ON WAR DANGER imperialist war, and Mao in his 20 May 1970
 statement specifically pointed to the need
for vigilance against a "new world war." But the Mao statement gave even more stress to popular revolution against imperialism as "the main trend in the world today"--a line which has been consistently maintained by the PRC up to the present. Thus, important Chinese pronouncements on foreign affairs over the past year, including Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping's 10 April 1974 address to the UN General Assembly's Special Session on Raw Materials and Chiao Kuan-hua's report to this year's General Assembly on 2 October highlighted Mao's warning against war but carefully added his assessment that revolution remains the main trend.

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PEKING GIVES HIGH-LEVEL WELCOME TO THAI OIL DELEGATION

Premier Chou En-lai's meeting with Thai Deputy Foreign Minister Chatchai Chunhawan in a Peking hospital on 8 January reflects Peking's growing interest in actively pursuing improved relations with Thailand. Chatchai was heading a Thai oil-purchasing delegation in Peking from 6-9 January, and his reception by Chou marked an advance over the Chinese welcome for the Thai economic delegation led by Deputy Minister of Commerce Prasong Sukhum that visited Peking last month to arrange trade ties in the wake of Thailand's 6 December repeal of its PRC trade ban. That delegation had been received by Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien. Peking media gave their usual factual coverage of the current delegation's activities, but avoided reference to the visitors' successfully concluded oil purchase, which was announced by the Thai Government.

While pushing ahead on relations with the Thai Government, in the week following the Thai officials' visit Peking reaffirmed its support for the Thai CP insurgents by replaying in NCNA two commentaries from the clandestine Voice of the People of Thailand (VOPT). On the day after the visitors' departure, NCNA reviewed a VOPT commentary that called attention to the growing trend toward use of oil by third world countries as a means to achieve political objectives; on the 13th NCNA replayed a VOPT review of peasant struggle in Thailand in 1974 but as usual omitted all-reference to the Sanya government.

The VOPT, which had not reported the visit of the Thai delegation to Peking in December, offered a straightforward report on the visit of the Chatchai delegation on 13 January. It noted that the PRC sale of diesel oil to Thailand at a special, low price came at a time when Thailand was experiencing economic difficulties caused by rising fuel prices charged by "monopolies" of the U.S. and "other foreign capitalists." Unlike the last VOPT broadcast on PRC-Thai relations--a 19 December report on the repeal of the Thai trade ban which sharply criticized the motives of the Sanya administration in undertaking trade with the PRC--the 13 January broadcast included only a single, neutral reference to "the Sanya government." VOPT has nevertheless maintained hardline polemical attacks against the Sanya administration in other broadcasts.

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USSR - POLAND

SOVIET MEDIA INDICATE STRONG APPROVAL OF GIEREK'S LEADERSHIP

Soviet satisfaction over the orderly restoration of Poland's internal stability under Gierek's stewardship since the December 1970 riots was underscored in the unusual prominence given by the Moscow press to the PZPR's 6-7 January plenum on ideology. Under the heading, "High Responsibility," PRAVDA on the 8th carried a lengthy TASS summary of Gierek's plenum speech, and a dispatch by IZVESTIYA's Warsaw correspondents published on the 11th praised Gierek's speech as well as Poland's closer ties with the Soviet Union and the socialist community. Both papers featured Gierek's statement that "we have managed to overcome" the "grave political crisis" of four years ago when he replaced Gomulka as PZPR First Secretary in the wake of the widespread Baltic seacoast riots protesting increased prices of consumer goods.

In effect endorsing Gierek's assessment of the unique requirements of the Polish situation, the Moscow papers approvingly noted his statement that improvement of the workers' material prosperity had been the focal point of his regime's policies. IZVESTIYA commented that Poland had moved into second place among the socialist countries in rate of growth of national income and industrial production and that "the fraternal internationalist bonds linking the Poles with the Soviet people and the entire socialist community have become even closer." Similarly, PRAVDA's report cited Gierek's stress on socialist economic integration with the USSR and its allies, as well as on democratic centralism, the leading role of the communist party, and raising the level of ideological indoctrination. IZVESTIYA's report viewed the plenum's decision to convene the 7th PZPR congress in the last quarter of 1975--barely four years after the last congress in December 1971--as evidence of a "dynamic" period ahead for the Polish party.

BACKGROUND Gierek's value to Moscow both as Poland's leader in a difficult period and as a figure respected by both East and West European communist parties has been particularly evident since December 1972, when he was chosen to speak on behalf of the visiting party delegations at a Kremlin reception on the 50th anniversary of the USSR. The Polish leader's prestige in the socialist countries and the world communist movement and his key role in the drive for a European security conference were underscored by Brezhnev in awarding an Order of Lenin to Gierek in Warsaw in May 1973. And in July 1974, Brezhnev used the occasion of a

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Katowice rally on the 30th anniversary of communist Poland to register Moscow's first official endorsement of an all-European communist party conference. Subsequently, the Polish party was selected, together with the Italian Communist Party, to arrange a "consultative" meeting of 28 East and West European communist parties in Warsaw on 16-18 October to begin preparations for the projected European communist party conference. In the area of East-West relations, Gierek's October 1974 visit to the United States was the first such visit by a top party leader of one of Moscow's orthodox East European allies. Moscow's strong interest in that visit was reflected in the visit by Gromyko to Warsaw without advance publicity on the eve of Gierek's departure for Washington.

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U S S R

VILLAGE CONSOLIDATION PROGRAM COMES UNDER NEW FIRE

The longtime controversy over the government's program to resettle peasants in new consolidated villages has flared up again recently, as critics--including leading slavophiles--have challenged the program on the grounds that it threatens the rural way of life and ignores the peasants' desire for private homes and private plots. The program, which has been pushed by Agriculture Minister Polyanskiy as a means of mechanizing and modernizing agriculture, and making rural life attractive enough to hold youth on the farm, aims at consolidating 700,000 villages into 110,000-120,000 modern rural towns, somewhat along the lines of Khrushchev's "agrogorod" scheme. Similar attacks on the program in LITERARY GAZETTE in late 1967 led to official admission of mistakes and a slowdown in the program; the present surge of criticism, reinforced by concern over the ballooning costs of rural construction, appears to be forcing modifications in the program again.

The latest criticism appeared in a 29 December PRAVDA article by Sergey Vikulov, chief editor of the literary journal OUR CONTEMPORARY and a leading spokesman for slavophile views. While acknowledging the need for a consolidation program, he complained that in many places it is changing the traditional Russian village into an ugly, colorless copy of the city and destroying the rural way of life. He insisted that multistory apartment buildings force a city way of life on the farmers and make it hard for them to maintain private plots, hence changing them from producers to consumers and putting a heavy additional strain on the state's food supply system. Vikulov argued that it would be easier for the country, "at least at present," if every rural family produced its own meat and milk products instead of buying them. Questioning whether rural apartment buildings are "sensible," he cited "foreign experience" in favor of construction of individual homes. He also criticized the design of the new wooden duplexes being built under the program as lacking even "a grain of architectural esthetics or of northern Russian native style" and urged designing of wooden houses "which would consider the traditional features of the rural way of life."

Vikulov has long been using his journal to promote these views, especially in carrying frequent articles by demographer V. I. Perevedentsev, who also has shown a strong pro-village, slavophile bias. Vikulov rated Perevedentsev's November 1972 OUR CONTEMPORARY

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article criticizing rural construction and the withholding of passports from kolkhozniks so highly that he awarded Perevedentsev the prize for best essay in his journal during 1972, according to an August 1973 NOVY MIR review.

Perevedentsev made a much sharper attack on the village consolidation program in the January 1974 OUR CONTEMPORARY, claiming that it could cost as much as 400 billion rubles. But it was his March 1974 OUR CONTEMPORARY article which took on the program in detail, advocating private homes instead of state-owned rural apartment buildings, defending private plots, and bitterly assailing attempts to replace rural culture with urban culture. He attacked planners for thinking that "everything urban is better than rural," condemned the notion that "city means culture, while village means lack of culture," and complained that "in the village traditional culture is now being squeezed out by modern city culture," which, he argued, is inferior to rural culture in many ways. Ridiculing rural apartment buildings, he stated that a kolkhoznik or sovkhos worker wants to live in his own individual house--as farmers do in "Scandinavia, Canada, the United States and other countries"--and expressed tongue-in-cheek wonder at the desire of city residents to seek country dachas. If the present trend in the consolidation program continues, he wrote, farmers will need dachas too, in order to enjoy the benefits of country life. The state stood to gain in two ways by allowing peasants to build their own homes, he argued: it would save construction costs and would also encourage farmers to maintain private plots, thus helping the food supply.

PRESSURE FOR PRIVATE HOUSES Recently there have been other signs of heightened debate and pressure for concessions to peasant preferences. Articles have challenged the idea that the state should build apartment buildings for farmers and have acknowledged that farmers want private houses. In a 29 August PRAVDA interview, G. N. Fomin, chairman of the State Committee for Civil Construction and Architecture, in responding to a question about the controversy over multi-family as opposed to single family homes, expressed a tolerant attitude toward the opposition and even suggested creating special firms to construct private homes.

A 5 September SOVIET RUSSIA article criticized the difficulties facing a farmer attempting to build his own house and reported a Bryansk poll which showed over 2,000 of 3,000 farmers questioned favoring an individual house with private plot over communal housing.

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In an October QUESTIONS OF ECONOMICS article, V. Stern argued strongly for allowing peasants to build their own homes and attacked planners who were trying to limit this. He argued that the costs of state-financed construction are prohibitive--50 billion rubles for just the Non-Chernozem Zone of the RSFSR alone--and that the state could save 200 million rubles if the share of private construction was increased by just 1 percent in the zone. He endorsed and expanded upon construction official Fomin's suggestion that special firms be set up to build houses for individuals. He praised the examples of Moscow oblast, which in 1968 began giving easy credit to encourage rural cooperative housing construction, and Lithuania, where 70 percent of the rural housing built in 1969-72 comprised individual homes. The head of the Lithuanian Agriculture Ministry's resettlement administration indicated in an October interview with the New York TIMES that his republic had given way to the peasants' insistence on private houses as the only way to induce Lithuanian farmers to leave their traditional villages for new villages.

Another article--in the 12 December IZVESTIYA--recounted the efforts of a Kemerovo oblast kolkhoznik to keep his private house. The article noted that private houses encourage private plots and that if private farming were eliminated in the oblast, meat and milk supplies in local stores would have to be increased by one third--an impossible task at present.

BACKGROUND OF CONSOLIDATION PROGRAM

The present village consolidation program is a scaled-down version of Khrushchev's "agrogorod" scheme of resettling peasants in urban-type towns. After Khrushchev's fall, the policy of building mainly high-rise apartments was repudiated, and in 1967 emphasis was shifted to two or three story buildings, which are less objectionable to farmers and still cheaper to build than individual houses. But in late 1967 LITERARY GAZETTE began a series of articles attacking these buildings on both esthetic and practical grounds. A hot public debate ensued, until Polyanskiy in March 1968 called both critics and defenders of the program into his office for a discussion, after which the officials in charge of the program were forced to back down. Nevertheless, Polyanskiy was further embarrassed when the Central Committee and Council of Ministers on 12 September 1968 issued a decree criticizing handling of the program and ordering a slower schedule. Polyanskiy has repeatedly appealed for funds for the resettlement program, stressing that increased agricultural production depends on it.

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The resettlement campaign was reinforced by the big program to develop the neglected regions of the RSFSR (the Non-Chernozem Zone) adopted upon Brezhnev's initiative in April 1974. The Central Committee-Council of Ministers decree on developing that zone allotted 35 billion rubles for production and non-production improvements during 1976-80 and established inducements for peasants to move from old villages to new farm towns, including long-term loans to build their own houses. Pskov oblast executive committee chairman B. Osipchik wrote in the 17 April RURAL LIFE that now with the new decree's inducements to resettle, "no one will doubt that resettlement will proceed on a growing scale." Fomin in the 29 August PRAVDA indicated that during 1976-80 170,000 families would be resettled in the Non-Chernozem Zone alone. However, while the program is proceeding, it appears that popular resistance to apartments and the financial burden on the state is gradually bringing more concessions in favor of private housing construction.

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YUGOSLAVIA

PARTY REVIVES CAMPAIGN AGAINST DISSIDENT BELGRADE PROFESSORS

One year after an intensive but abortive effort by the League of Communists to purge a small group of liberal professors at Belgrade University, the party weekly KOMUNIST has called for a renewed campaign to oust the professors. The KOMUNIST exhortation, reported by TANJUG on the 11th, was accompanied by stepped-up criticism of the eight professors of the university's philosophy faculty and their supporters in the West.

Admitting that "all means of democratic procedure" had been exhausted in the party's unsuccessful campaign against the professors, KOMUNIST declared that "it is therefore time for the responsible organs of society to act with determination" to return the philosophy faculty "to normality." KOMUNIST also seemed to acknowledge the likelihood of strong public condemnation of the proposed ouster in stating that the campaign would have to be waged "without complexes." Unlike the campaign last year, KOMUNIST abandoned the pretense of broad public support for the party's efforts, and in fact acknowledged student support for the professors in asserting that they had used the dispensation of scholarships and fellowships "for tying individual students to themselves." The article stressed the professors' ties to "a small group of West European anarchists and Trotskyites" and drew attention to their "political and material support" from abroad, including speaking engagements at American and West European universities.

BACKGROUND The professors have been under attack since 1968 for their lectures and articles in the journal PRAXIS, in which they have charged Yugoslavia's ruling communists with perpetuating a Stalinist system, inconsistent with their own lofty statements about self-management. Tito and others have labeled the professors "anarcho-liberals"; and last January the party--supported by a vehement press campaign--attempted to have them expelled from the university. The university, with strong faculty and student support, resisted the attack, however. Subsequently, the party appeared to suspend its campaign as it attempted to project an image of unity in preparation for the party congress in late May. Last summer, according to Hamburg's DPA on 6 August, the authorities reportedly reached a compromise settlement with the professors.

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By September, however, five students and a professor who had drawn up a resolution supporting the professors in January were sentenced in Ljubljana to 10 months imprisonment for defaming the state. The following month the chairman of the Belgrade party organization, in an interview for the 17 October NARODNA ARMIJA, complained that actions thus far against the professors had taken place in "rather a formalistic manner" and asserted that the party was prepared to "move to settle the situation." The Serbian Government subsequently passed a law strengthening its control over the university and faculty assignments. Serbian party leader Dragoslav Markovic, in an interview for the 31 December-1, 2 January POLITIKA, candidly admitted that the new law was designed "to provide for the possibility of removing a number of professors from the faculty." He also attacked Western critics of the party's stand, as did BORBA in a 7 January commentary which derided Western critics for representing the professors as "champions of democracy and freedom."

SLOVENIA RESISTS BELGRADE IN DISPUTE OVER ECONOMIC AGREEMENT

Belgrade's continuing difficulties with regional differences were pointed up recently by a dispute with Slovenia over control of government expenditures. In support of its efforts to integrate the regions into a cohesive federal state, Belgrade has been trying to eliminate regional autonomy in all facets of the economy. Slovenia, as the richest province, has resisted efforts at federal control. The issue was brought to a head by a federal proposal to fight inflation by limiting regional government spending on social service programs.

A proposed spending limitation agreement drawn up by the federal government was approved on 27 December in the new Chamber of Republics and Provinces. Slovenia accepted the agreement in principle, but demanded and received concessions. It contended that the spending limitation should not apply across the board, arguing that the limitation was set too low for industrialized Slovenia. It also questioned Belgrade's constitutional authority to determine limitations for the republics and provinces. The Slovene Socialist Alliance daily DELO on 24 December maintained that such an assumption of authority by Belgrade smacked of a "centralist and statist-like" approach.

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Slovene officials also protested that the companion guideline for computing spending limitations had the effect of portraying Slovenia as an opponent of Yugoslav unity since it specifically allowed Slovenia to follow a different formula from that used by the other regions. The Slovene Government, according to DELO on the 26th, "sharply rejected" the federal government's formulation because it implied that "Slovenia would represent some kind of exception in Yugoslavia." One Slovene official contended that it "was not purely accidental" that the proposed guideline "exposed Slovenia to some derision," pointing to "ancient aspirations" for boosting the economies of the poorer regions at the expense of Slovenia. In protesting the federal government's guideline, Slovenia also proposed a formula of its own for calculating spending limitations.

Subsequently attempting to explain the federal government's intention, Federal Finance Secretary Cemovic maintained, according to DELO on the 28th, that the guideline was proposed "only" as an "initiative" for further discussion and that it was designed to take into account the specific economies "not only of one but of all the republics and provinces." The finally adopted agreement, reported by TANJUG on the 27th, omitted the references which offended Slovenia while allowing the individual regions to accept spending limitations on the basis of either the Belgrade proposals or the Slovene-favored formula. DELO on the 28th greeted the Slovene victory in a front-page editorial hailing the agreement as insuring that the "anti-inflation program would be one for Yugoslavia as a whole, as well as for each of its parts separately, and that each region would contribute in its own way and in accordance with its own situation. . . ."

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K O R E A

PYONGYANG SHOWS CONCERN OVER LOYALTY OF COMMUNIST ALLIES

An authoritative 13 January NODONG SINMUN editorial article has belatedly rejected a U.S. proposal made in November that suggested contacts between the United States and North Korea depended on reciprocal steps by the USSR and PRC towards the South. The United States first explicitly advanced this proposal in public in late November when Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Habib raised it in Seoul during the President's visit there. Habib's comments elicited no DPRK reaction then, and there have been no new statements by U.S. officials to prompt Pyongyang's response now.

The NODONG SINMUN article demonstrated Pyongyang's anxiety over the fidelity of its powerful allies, showing far more concern about socialist countries recognizing the South than over rebuffing U.S. overtures toward the North. The article seemed a response not only to the U.S. proposal, but also to persistent rumors that the Soviet Union is considering recognition of the government of South Korean President Pak Chong-hui. Pak noted his receptivity to relations with communist countries in the summer of 1973, and occasionally there have been public reports of contacts since then. Most recently, Seoul radio reported on 11 January that South Korean and Soviet representatives to a World Trade Center meeting in New York had met to discuss the possibility of establishing USSR-ROK trade relations.

Rumors of alleged Chinese and Soviet dealings with the Pak government set off a propaganda exchange between Moscow and Peking in early November 1974, during which both stoutly proclaimed allegiance to Pyongyang while accusing each other of colluding with Seoul. Since that exchange Moscow has felt compelled several times to publicly deny stories that it is interested in establishing relations with the "present regime" in Seoul. Until now, Pyongyang has not publicly acknowledged either the allegations or Moscow and Peking denials.

In the NODONG SINMUN article Pyongyang charged that the United States is spreading the rumor that "a certain socialist country" is engaged in "backstage negotiations" and that "some sort of 'agreement' has been reached." There is no elaboration on these points, and it is unclear if the "negotiations" and "agreement" refer just to recognition of South Korea by that "certain socialist country" (by which Pyongyang

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means the Soviet Union) or also to reciprocal U.S. recognition of the DPRK. According to the article, the United States is spreading such a rumor, and advancing the cross recognition formula, in order to "shore up" the Pak government and retain South Korea as a base for "Asian aggression."

To forestall the recognition of South Korea by a socialist government Pyongyang advanced two basic arguments in the NODONG SINMUN article. First, echoing other DPRK propaganda disparaging Seoul's credentials as a sovereign government, it charged the "bogus" regime in Seoul is a mindless "marionette" of the United States, having neither "right nor capacity" for independent action. The "only state" of the Korean nation, asserted Pyongyang, is the DPRK. Secondly, implicitly challenging the socialist credentials of any socialist state that might recognize the South, Pyongyang argued that "by nature" no socialist government could deal with the Pak government, since socialist states "cannot deal with puppets. . . still less recognize them." Recognizing the Pak government, according to NODONG SINMUN, would be "tantamount to recognizing U.S. imperialist occupation of South Korea" and supporting the U.S. "colonial enslavement policy."

Dismissing as "piffle" the U.S. stand that, under the cross recognition formula, it is ready to improve relations with the DPRK, NODONG SINMUN contended Pyongyang has neither "willingness nor . . . need" to improve U.S.-DPRK relations so long as U.S. troops are in the South. Assuming a typical North Korean posture, it argued there can be "no compromise with the aggressors" nor "concession to the occupationists."

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NOTES

MOSCOW ON CSCE RECESS: Moscow comment during the 20 December-20 January recess of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Geneva has consistently expressed optimism that the talks will finally wind up in the next few months. Moscow radio's V. Levin told his domestic audience on 10 January that "concrete data" allowed one to agree with a reported statement by the Finnish foreign minister that the second stage of CSCE would be completed by the end of March or the beginning of April. PRAVDA's Geneva correspondent A. Melnikov, in a 25 December summary of the progress made during the fall session, expressed the hope that the winter recess would be used by all parties to prepare for the "finishing dash" after the recess to conclude stage two. The end-of-the-year IZVESTIYA editorial on 31 December was most optimistic in its evaluation, observing that the "considerable progress" which had been made at the conference "guarantees the possibility of its conclusion at the summit level in the first half of 1975." While several Soviet commentators have similarly noted the "considerable progress" this fall, they have highlighted the problem of reaching agreement on procedures for advance notification of large-scale military exercises, and have also been quick to point out that difficulties remain in the area of "humanitarian issues." Moscow has sought to make propaganda points by counterposing the allegations of CIA domestic surveillance activities against the demands made by the Western states on the socialist states in discussing the "humanitarian problems."

U.S.-LATIN TRADE, DIALOGUE: Moscow, Havana and Peking have been in rare agreement in approvingly citing Latin American criticisms of the recent U.S. Trade Reform Act. IZVESTIYA's R. Tuchnin, in an 11 January article describing the effects of the new law on U.S. policy in Latin America, characterized the law as a restatement of "monopoly capital's credo" of reprisals against any movement toward economic independence. He noted that Latins equated the "sinister" law with the "crudest methods of the 'big bludgeon' policy" and quoted a Mexican journalist as remarking that the vaunted "new dialogue" between the United States and Latin America "now smacks more of a duel." Havana radio, in two international service commentaries, observed that the law, "the most recent example of U.S. imperialist policy," had evoked "a wave of violent protests" in Latin America. Noting that several Latin countries might boycott the next round of U.S.-Latin American talks--the

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foreign ministers' meeting scheduled for March in Buenos Aires--Havana asserted that the dialogue was, in reality, simply the "old dialogue" of the imposition of U.S. will on Latin America. Peking's NCNA, which has given extensive coverage to protests by South American leaders, declared on 6 January that the new law was "designed to exert pressure" on developing countries because it forced on them "discriminatory and retaliatory restrictions." NCNA said the law, which was "railroaded through by the U.S. Congress," had been "denounced and rejected by Latin America."

RELEASE OF LATIN LEFTISTS: Communist media have welcomed the recent release from prison of two of Latin America's prominent leftist political figures--Chilean socialist Clodomiro Almeyda, who served as Salvador Allende's foreign minister, and Rodney Arismendi, secretary general of the Uruguayan Communist Party. But while Moscow attributed Almeyda's release to the effectiveness of the Soviet-sponsored world solidarity movement on behalf of Chilean prisoners, Bucharest sought to take credit for the action. Thus TASS, reporting the release of Almeyda on the 11th, declared that Chilean President Pinochet was "compelled" to act because of pressure from the "world movement" for Chilean freedom, and it repeated Moscow's demand that Chilean Communist Party chief Luis Corvalan be freed as well. Along the same lines, a Havana radio commentary on the 14th claimed that the Chilean Government acted in response to the "international campaign" for human rights in Chile. However, Romania, which maintains diplomatic relations with Chile and is now hosting Almeyda, attributed his release solely to Romanian efforts. A Bucharest domestic service report on the 12th noted that Almeyda was freed "in the wake of the personal intervention of Ceausescu." As for the release of Uruguayan CP leader Arismendi on 6 January, TASS reported that he expressed "profound gratitude" to the Soviet Government and to the "powerful movement of solidarity" which had forced Uruguayan authorities to free him. Prague and Sofia, the only Eastern Europeans reporting Arismendi's release, have followed the tenor of Soviet reports, with the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee stating that Arismendi's freedom was new evidence of the strength of "international solidarity."

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CHINESE PEOPLE'S CONGRESS: Peking's most direct indication to date that the long-awaited National People's Congress will be convened soon was provided by Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping on 15 January. In a eulogy at the funeral of Vice Premier Li Fu-chun, Teng revealed that Li had been "elected a deputy to the fourth National People's Congress." Peking had not previously reported the election of delegates to this congress. Teng's speech contained no other hint that the NPC is imminent, but a recent gap in top provincial leadership appearances--no provincial first secretary has appeared publicly in his own province since 5 January--may indicate that provincial leaders have been called to Peking to attend either preparatory meetings or the NPC itself. None of the missing first secretaries were listed by NCNA as having attended Li's funeral. The funeral also marked Chou En-lai's first appearance outside the hospital since he hosted a National Day banquet on 30 September last year.

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A P P E N D I X

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 6-12 JANUARY 1975

<u>Moscow (2359 items)</u>			<u>Peking (921 items)</u>		
China	(5%)	7%	Malta Prime Minister	(--)	9%*
70th Anniversary of	(--)	5%	Mintoff in PRC		
1905 Revolution			PRC-Botswana Diplomatic	(--)	6%
Party-Government New	(7%)	4%	Relations		
Year's Message to			Indochina	(7%)	5%
Soviet People			[Vietnam	(5%)	3%]
Soyuz 17 Flight	(--)	3%	Economic Crisis in West	(3%)	3%
			Latin America	(1%)	3%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

* This figure excludes brief reports on Mao Tse-tung's meeting with Mintoff.